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The importance of oil prices to explain eco-
nomic fluctuations emerged when the remarkable
price stability that characterized the Golden Age
period was interrupted in the early 70s. The recent
conflicts on Iraq and the strong increase of oil
prices in 2004 contributed to perk up the debate
concerning the importance of oil prices to industri-
alized economies, as scenarios of a new oil shock
have been frequently put forward.
This paper resumes the main channels through
which oil prices affect the economy. Recent empiri-
cal findings are confronted with simple indicators
and some models simulations, as a way to derive
useful rules of thumb for the effects of oil prices
both in real activity and inflation. Concerning the
direct and short-run effects on inflation an elastic-
ity of around 0.01 seems to hold over the last 30
years across the countries considered (G7 and Por-
tugal). Concerning GDP, elasticities of around
-0.02 for the main developed countries (underlying
a higher value for the euro area countries) and
-0.04 for Portugal emerge as possible rules of
thumb when oil prices are at a level around 25
USD.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the evolution of oil prices against infla-
tion and GDP growth in the OECD area since the
early 70s. Asimple graphic analysis shows that pe-
riods with more pronounced increases in oil prices
were connected with higher inflations and lower
GDP growth rates.
Section 3 presents the main channels underly-
ing the transmission of oil prices to the economy.
Despite the great unanimity concerning the signal
of the effects on inflation and GDP, the transmis-
sion channels underlying those effects are complex
and evolve over time. Nevertheless, an oil price
shock would inevitably produce lower effects to-
day than in the past given the reduction of the oil
expenditure share on GDP— reflecting the decline
of the relative price of oil as well as the reduction
in the consumption of oil per unit of output — and
the lessons drawn for monetary authorities from
the past oil price shocks. Reflecting a more inten-
sive use of oil and a strong sensitiveness to the ex-
ternal environment, that characterizes a small and
open economy, the effects on the Portuguese econ-
omy are more pronounced than in the main devel-
oped countries.
Section 4 presents estimates for the overall im-
pact of an oil price increase on GDP and prices,
both for the main developed countries and Portu-
gal. Despite the considerable uncertainty sur-
rounding those estimates, they may constitute use-
ful rules of thumb.
Finally, section 6 resumes the main conclusions.
2. OIL PRICES AND THE ECONOMY SINCE
THE EARLY 70S
The remarkable stability of oil prices during the
Golden Age period was interrupted in the 70s. Re-
flecting the premeditated action of OPEC (Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries), by con-
Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / December 2004 51
Articles
* The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and
not necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal.
** Economic Research Department.
*** ANACOM, Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações previously at
the Economic Research Department.straining the quantity supplied to the market, oil
prices reached 11.5 USD per barrel in 1974, more
than tripling from the previous year and almost 5
times above the 1972 figure. Some years later, in
1980-81, oil prices increased again sharply, reach-
ing values around 30 USD per barrel, doubling
from the levels achieved in the previous year.
During these two oil shocks, the inflation rate
in OECD countries reached maximum figures of
about 15 per cent in 1974 and 13 per cent in 1980,
while the GDP decelerated intensely to rates of
growth close to zero in 1975 and 1982, after aver-
age values around 4-5 per cent observed in the
years before the two oil shocks (see Chart 1)(1).
In the first half of the 80s, the OPEC became un-
able to enforce the production quotas set for its
members and new producers entered the market.
Given the increasing oil supply and the serious
disagreements within OPEC, prices started to de-
cline, collapsing in 1986 and starting to fluctuate
within a narrower band. During this period, infla-
tion in OECD countries recorded a noticeable
downward trend from two digit figures to figures
close to 2 per cent, while the GDP growth became
more stable — the standard deviation of the GDP
growth rate decreased to almost half of the figure
registered in the period 1970-1985.
Over the last years, however, oil price volatility
remained a central feature of the world economy.
Oil prices decreased to around 10 USD per barrel
in late 1998 and early 1999. After seriously mis-
judging the oil market in that period, OPEC has
successfully pushed prices upward, and prices in-
creased vigorously, reaching figures close to 30
USD per barrel in 2000(2). Most recently, oil prices
registered a pronounced increase, namely reflect-
ing the developments related with the war in Iraq,
reaching a new historical maximum above the 50
USD during the second half of 2004.
Despite the less pronounced fluctuations than
in the past, oil prices continue to influence deci-
sively inflation, being also frequently pointed out
as a key factor explaining the real fluctuations of
the OECD economies. For instance, Muelbauer
and Nunziata (2001) successfully predicted the US
economy recession in 2001 using a multivariate
analysis in which oil prices play a prominent role.
Thus, the recent increase of the oil price to levels
above 40 USD bring back the fears of a new slow-
down in the world economy.
3. PASS-THROUGH CHANNELS FROM OIL
PRICE CHANGES
The most usual channels to explain the effects
of oil prices on the economy are the strong link be-
tween oil prices and the terms of trade (see Backus
and Crucini (2000)) and the role of oil as an inter-
mediate production factor (see Bruno and Sachs
(1985)). Both channels explain why an oil price in-
crease tend to raise inflation and to decrease GDP.
The relation between oil prices and inflation is
easily achieved, namely considering the strong
link between energy consumer prices and oil
prices, while a negative correlation of oil prices
with GDP was reported, among others, by Hamil-
ton (1983), Mork et al. (1994), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1996), Raymond and Rich (1997),
Bernanke et al. (1997), Hamilton (2003), Jiménez-
Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004) and Jones et al.
(2004). Moreover, the same negative correlation
seems to emerge when microeconomic data is
used (see, for instance, Keane and Prasad (1996),
Davis and Haltiwanger(2001), Lee and Ni (2002)).
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Sources: OECD and Thomson Financial Datastream.
(1) The brent crude prices are the ones considered (retropolated
for the period before 1983 using the prices of the Arabian light
crude).
(2) For the role of OPEC in this period see Kohl (2000).However, some controversy remains in respect
to the transmission channels underlying those ef-
fects. Firstly, these effects tend to evolve over time,
reflecting the declining vulnerability of the indus-
trialized economies to oil prices (see Hooker
(1996)). Secondly, those effects could be complex
and difficult to estimate, as they depend on the re-
action of policy authorities and on the expecta-
tions concerning the persistence of the shock.
More recently, Hamilton (2003) supported this last
point, confirming that oil prices increases are
much more important than oil prices decreases,
and that increases after a period of stable prices
tend to produce larger effects than the ones that
correct previous declines on prices, explaining a
non-linear relationship between oil prices and
economy.
As the aim of this section is to present in a very
simple manner the channels surrounding the ef-
fects of oil prices fluctuations on economy (see
also Stuber (2001)), those channels are presented
separately in terms of inflation and GDP.
3.1. Effects on inflation(3)
The channels through which oil prices affect
consumer prices could be distinguished between
first round effects — further decomposed in direct
and indirect effects — and second round effects
(see also Bank of England (2000)).
3.1.1. First round effects
First round effects reflect the fact that fuel — as
well as goods and services with a direct content of
oil (transports, for instance) — is included in the
consumer price index. First round effects on prices
can be direct and indirect, as it is useful to distin-
guish the impact on the energy components of the
index, the so called direct effects, and the impact
on the components of the index that have a high
content of energy, the so called indirect effects.
Direct effects
Considering the direct effects, the larger the
share of energy — fuels, electricity and gas — in
consumption expenditure the larger the direct im-
pact on the CPI of a given energy price change.
The importance and the structure of tax rates
also affects the size of these first round direct ef-
fects If the tax rate has an ad valorem structure (i.e.
the tax corresponds to a fixed proportion of the fi-
nal price) an increase in the cost of energy will be
totally transmitted to the consumer. However, if
the tax corresponds to a specific tax (i.e. x cents by
unit of energy) an increase in the cost of energy
will be only partially transmitted to the consumer,
at least before any adjustment of the tax. Usually,
tax systems are more complex than these very sim-
ple illustrations, reflecting the existence of both ad
valorem and specific components. Chart 2 shows
the sizeable discrepancies of the tax component in
unleaded gasoline prices across several coun-
tries,which are reflected on the final consumer
prices given that prices before taxes should be
very similar across the different economies(4). The
tax component is considerable higher in the Euro-
pean countries, including Portugal, than in the
non-European G7 countries.
Table 1 shows for the G7 countries the very
strong correlation between annual rates of change
of oil prices in national currency and the consumer
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Source: OECD.
(3) This sub-section follows very closely Esteves and Neves (2004).
(4) The overall picture would be the same considering the diesel
prices. More detailed information is easily obtained in the
OECD International Energy Agency (IEA) quarterly publica-
tion (Energy prices & Taxes).energy components of the national CPIs. A simple
linear estimation between these two variables
points to an elasticity around 0.1, i.e. that the en-
ergy component of the CPI tends to react by 1 to
10 to the change in oil prices.
An important result is the stability of this rule
of thumb. In fact, the same rule holds when data
from 1986 to 2003 is used and thus there is no evi-
dence that a smaller vulnerability of inflation to oil
prices could be attributed to a decline of the mag-
nitude of the so called first round direct effects.
Moreover, the results do not suggest very signifi-
cant differences across countries, namely con-
nected with the above mentioned differences on
taxes on energy products.
Finally, the results for Portugal have a lower
statistical significance (suggesting other important
factors explaining energy prices) but the estimates
are not very different from the G7 average. The ex-
ception occurs in the period 1986-2002, where en-
ergy prices registered a lower sensitivity to oil
prices changes. This result is likely to have been
determined by the policy followed in the later 90s
(abandoned in 2002) that isolated the consumer
fuel prices from the fluctuations of oil prices in in-
ternational markets, by allowing the change of tax-
ation on fuel products. In fact, when the latest
years of sample are excluded, the estimated elas-
ticity between oil and consumer energy prices be-
came closer to the ones obtained for the G7 aver-
age.
Combining this sensitivity to the present
weight of energy in final household’s consumption
— which tends to be close to 10 per cent — one
concludes that inflation reacts by approximately 1
to 100 to the change in oil prices. That is, if the
price of oil increases by 100 per cent, the direct ef-
fect on inflation is roughly one percentage point.
This rule of thumb gives a rough approximation of
the magnitude of the direct first round effects of
an oil price change in inflation. And this rule
seems to have been broadly stable reflecting the
stability of oil component expenditure share on to-
tal consumption. Despite the decline of the relative
price of oil and of the oil consumption per unit of
output, the stability of this share could be ex-
plained by an increase of the tax component on en-
ergy consumer prices(5).
An important feature is the high speed of trans-
mission to prices underlying these direct effects.
This point is illustrated in Chart 3 that presents the
quarterly correlation coefficients between oil
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Table 1
OIL PRICES AND CONSUMER ENERGY PRICES





U S A................................................. 0.741 0.143
Japan ................................................ 0.763 0.128
Germany ............................................. 0.662 0.097
France ............................................... 0.811 0.139
Italy ................................................. 0.797 0.156
Oil prices in national
currency
U K.................................................. 0.568 0.101
Canada .............................................. 0.416 0.066
G7 (weighted average) ................................. 0.721 0.130




Sources: OECD, Thomson Financial Datastream and Banco de Portugal.
Notes:
(a) Considering data from 1986 to 2003.
(b) Considering data from 1986 to 1998.prices changes in national currency changes and
the lagged and led changes of the consumer en-
ergy prices (the shadow area corresponds to the
correlation coefficients not statistically different
from zero at a 95 percent confidence level).
As expected the correlation structure points to
a causality from oil prices to energy prices — the
correlations using lagged energy prices are not sta-
tistically different from zero.
Considering data for the G7 countries, the evo-
lution of oil prices just tends to affect the chain
rate of the energy consumer prices in the current
and one step ahead quarters — this means that
these direct effects tend to occur during three
months after the oil price change, and there is no
evidence of a different transmission profile since
the second half of the 80s, reinforcing the stability
of the above mentioned rule of thumb. The results
for Portugal suggest that the transmission was
slightly slower — however, the data for the latest
years point to some evidence of an increasing
speed of transmission.
Indirect effects
As mentioned above, changes in oil prices will
also produce first round indirect effects as prices
of goods and services with some content of energy
will react to an increase in the cost of energy. The
most obvious cases are transports (air and surface)
— components highly energy-intensive — but a
large proportion of the price index is also likely to
be affected.
Contrarily to the above mentioned direct effects
it is not straightforward to derive any quantifica-
tion of these indirect effects. However, as the mag-
nitude of these effects on price depends on the im-
portance of energy as an input, there are two rea-
sons why they should be smaller in current days
than in the 70s(6).
Firstly, there was a strong decline in the use of
oil per unit of GDP in the OECD countries (Chart
4). It is common to accept that this decline in oil in-
tensity reflected the adjustment of the world econ-
omy to a new era of higher and more unpredict-
able oil prices, through the use of alternative
sources of energy and more energy-efficient tech-
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(5) Despite the same effects on energy prices, it should be stressed
out that the results for the economy are of course different, be-
cause part of the energy price increase is transferred to a do-
mestic sector, e.g. the public sector, instead to the oil exporter
country.
Chart 3
OIL PRICES (QUARTER t) AND ENERGY PRICES (QUARTER t+i)
(Correlation coefficients)
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Sources: OECD and Banco de Portugal.
(6) Of course, as in consumer energy prices, those effects could
have been balanced by the increase of energy taxes. However,
it should be stressed that the increase of taxes on the energy
used at the production sector should have been lower than the
ones observed at the consumer level.nologies. It should be mentioned that this trend
was not observed in Portugal, reflecting probably
a different stage of its developing process during
the period, characterized namely by a decline of
the weight of the agricultural sector.
Secondly, there was a decline of the oil prices in
real terms (Chart 5), diminishing its role as a pro-
duction input. Considering the US GDP deflator(7),
the relative price of oil stood throughout the 90s at
levels that correspond to less than half the maxi-
mum levels observed in the early 80s.
Finally, the increase of competition, in particu-
lar in those markets more exposed to oil prices,
may have reduced the ability to transpose to final
prices the increase of energy costs.
3.1.2. Second round effects
In addition, price developments are also af-
fected by the so called second round effects, that
are related with macroeconomic reaction to a
change of oil price. Besides the above mentioned
first round indirect effects, these second round ef-
fects constitute an additional factor why changes
in consumer energy prices tend to produce con-
temporaneous but also lagged effects on the re-
maining components of CPI. This point is illus-
trated in Table 2 that presents the correlation coef-
ficients between the annual change of oil prices in
national currency and the lagged and led changes
of consumer prices excluding food and energy
(usually referred as underlying inflation).
As expected, the correlation coefficients are not
so significant as in the case of the energy prices
(Table 1), as other factors than oil prices are more
important to explain non-energy prices. Neverthe-
less, the results suggests that energy prices tend to
explain changes on the other prices — the highest
coefficients are to the one year ahead underlying
inflation(8).
Typically, the second round effects are associ-
ated with a circular wage-price causality. If em-
ployees do manage to increase their nominal
wages in line with the rise in consumer prices —
rather than accepting lower real wages — addi-
tional inflation pressures emerge, through a
wage-price spiral. Therefore, the magnitude of
those second round effects clearly depend on the
labour market flexibility and on the credibility of
monetary policy, which is key to the formation of
inflation expectations The experience of the two oil
price shocks is able to describe the important role
of monetary policy.
In the oil price shock of 1973-1974 there is a
strong evidence that substantial second round ef-
fects on inflation took place in many industrial
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Chart 5
OIL PRICES IN REAL TERMS
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(7) Real price of oil estimated for the US economy in order to al-
low a direct comparison between the GDP deflator and the in-
ternational oil price denominated in USD.
Sources: OECD and Thomson Financial Datastream.
(8) This is reason why inflation measures that exclude the evolu-
tion of energy prices do not constitute a reliable measure of
core inflation (see Marques et al. (2002)).economies. This outcome reflects the combined ef-
fects of latent inflationary pressures, already pres-
ent in the beginning of the 70s, the large magni-
tude of the oil price shock, the relatively low flexi-
bility of labour markets and, last but not the least,
the accommodative stance of monetary policies in
the more advanced economies. It is commonly ac-
cepted by economists that a tighter monetary pol-
icy was required, as suggested by the fact that ex
post real interest rates became negative in 1974 and
remained so until 1978, in a large number of coun-
tries. The lack of anti-inflationary credibility con-
tributed to unsustainable levels of real wages and
thus to marked increases in the unemployment
rate.
The experience with the second oil price shock
was different. In spite of the fact that inflation re-
mained high in the period 1981-82 — at two digit
figures — it fell significantly in the subsequent
years. A decisive factor for that evolution was the
decline in real wages, in clear contrast with what
had happened in the first oil price shock. In addi-
tion, the response of monetary policy — character-
ized by increases in the nominal interest rates —
assured that ex post real interest rates were posi-
tive. Monetary policy was relatively successful in
the second oil price shock, as measured by the
moderate evolution of inflation expectations and
the subsequent reduction of inflation(9).
These lessons drawn for monetary policy au-
thorities from the previous shocks and a more
flexible labour market — through more decentral-
ized wage settlements and the increasing competi-
tion from countries with much lower wages, fol-
lowing the world economy globalization — should
allow for lower second round effects on inflation
than the ones observed in the past.
3.2. Terms of trade effects
Oil price increases represent a negative terms of
trade shock for oil net importers countries. As-
suming that oil demand is inelastic to its price, the
effect of an oil price shock is totally transmitted to
GDP by the increase of the domestic resources that
are necessary to reallocate in order to assure the
same imported oil volume. Thus a very simple in-
dicator to account for this income effect is given by
the weight of import oil to GDP(10).
Using this indicator, the results presented in Ta-
ble 3 show a generalized decrease of the GDP sen-
sitiveness to oil prices during the last 30 years, re-
flecting the use of less energy-intensive technolo-
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Table 2
ENERGY PRICES VS UNDERLYING INFLATION
(Annual rates of growth, 1977-2003)
Correlation coefficients
Overall consumer prices excluding food and energy
t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
U S A............................ 0.143 0.336 0.403 0.209 -0.021
Japan........................... -0.070 0.063 0.163 0.116 -0.064
Germany ....................... -0.048 0.170 0.236 0.176 -0.059
Oil prices in national
currency (t)
France.......................... 0.203 0.257 0.261 0.277 0.234
Italy............................ 0.196 0.334 0.336 0.264 0.182
U K............................. 0.129 0.317 0.231 -0.001 -0.117
Canada ......................... 0.126 0.150 0.370 0.390 0.151
G7 (weighted average)............ 0.092 0.254 0.313 0.191 0.003
Portugal ........................ 0.165 0.322 0.380 0.363 0.375
Source: OECD.
(9) On this issue, European Central Bank (2000) provides a very
useful discussion for the euro area.
(10)The use of this rule could also be justified by the use of a pro-
duction function where besides labour and capital oil is consid-
ered as an intermediate factor (see Esteves (2004)).gies and the reduction of the relative price of oil.
Table 3 also highlights the higher sensitiveness of
the Portuguese GDP to oil prices fluctuations. The
share of net oil imports to GDP in Portugal is al-
most 0.04 considering the whole period, declining
to around 0.025 in the 1986-2002 period and in-
creasing to almost 0.03 in the period 2001-2002.
The weighted average of the six countries consid-
ered(11) moved from -0.02 in all period to a value
close to -0.01 at the end of the sample.
However, these initial effects are enlarged by
the spillover effects related with external trade
links across economies. Using the trade-income
elasticities presented in Hooper et al. (2000) to
compute these spillover effects, estimates for the
overall effect on GDP are presented in the right
side of Table 3(12).
Considering the average figures for 2001-2002,
this analyses point to an average GDP-oil price
elasticity close to -0.02, but with important differ-
ences across countries — from values between
-0.01 and -0.015 for UK, US and Japan to values be-
tween -0.02 and -0.03 for most euro area countries.
The highest elasticity is achieved to Portugal
(around -0.04), given the more intensive use of oil
but also by higher spillover effects reflecting the
openness level of the Portuguese economy.
This rule should be carefully used, and the re-
sults presented above should be conditioned on
the observed oil prices — around 25 USD in the
period 2001-2002. Reflecting the lack of an unitary
substitution between oil and the other production
factors (see Backus and Crucini (2000) and Esteves
(2004)), the oil expenditure share in GDP depends
on its relative price. This feature implies a
non-linear effect of an oil price change, towards a
higher elasticity when the imports share (i.e. oil
price) is higher. In other words, for instance, a 100
per cent increase of oil prices will produce higher
results when the reference scenario considers as
baseline an oil price of 40 USD per barrel than one
of 10 USD. The use of a constant elasticity — re-
flecting a sample average — could be misleading
given the traditional volatility of oil prices.
It is also worth mentioning that those elastici-
ties do not account for the effects related with the
monetary policy reaction to an oil price increase.
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Table 3
TERMS OF TRADE ELASTICITIES
Energy net exports (% of GDP) Considering spillover effects
1977-2002 1986-2002 2001-2002 1977-2002 1986-2002 2001-2002
U S A............................................ -0.012 -0.008 -0.010 -0.016 -0.010 -0.012
Japan............................................ -0.022 -0.012 -0.014 -0.027 -0.014 -0.017
Germany ........................................ -0.019 -0.011 -0.013 -0.038 -0.022 -0.026
France........................................... -0.017 -0.009 -0.011 -0.038 -0.020 -0.024
Italy............................................. -0.031 -0.016 -0.019 -0.052 -0.028 -0.033
U K .............................................. -0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.020 -0.010 -0.010
Weighted average ................................ -0.016 -0.009 -0.011 -0.025 -0.014 -0.017
Portugal......................................... -0.037 -0.024 -0.029 -0.060 -0.036 -0.043
Sources: Using data from OECD, Banco de Portugal and Hooper et al. (2000).
(11)The Canada was not consider because its energy net imports
are very influenced by the non-oil component.
(12)The overall effect on GDP of each country (vector ET)i sc o m -
puted according to:














* is the diagonal matrix composed by the weighs
of exports in GDP per country
x
y multiplied by the respective






*, is a matrix where
each line represents the trade partners shares on the exports of
each country,  diag my  , is the diagonal matrix with the imports
elasticities to domestic income in each country and E0 is the vector
of the initial effects given by the weigh of energy net exports on
GDP.4. CURRENT ESTIMATES FOR THE OIL PRICES
EFFECTS
The focus of this section in on the quantitative
assessment of the effects of oil prices on inflation
and GDP both for G7 countries and Portugal.
Those results should be considered as illustrative,
because the usual caveats when dealing with these
kind of models produce a lot of uncertainty on the
results: (i) the macroeconometric models consti-
tute a very simplified representation of the real
world and thus do not capture precisely the func-
tioning of the economy; (ii) econometric simula-
tions tends to reproduce the average behaviour of
the economy, and, in general, do not deal easily
with the above mentioned structural changes re-
lated with oil intensity or the weight of energy
taxes in consumer prices; (iii) the simulations re-
sults depend crucially on the assumptions on the
form of economic agents expectations and the re-
action of monetary and fiscal policies.
Besides these usual problems when simulating
models, an important issue is that the usual
macroeconometric models do not seems to be able
to produce reliable results concerning the effects of
oil prices on GDP. For instance, the simulations of
the OECD Interlink model and of the IMF
Multimod (reported in Dalsgaard et al. (2001) and
Hunt et al. (2001), respectively) point to very low
effects of oil prices on GDP. In spite of being com-
monly used to produce scenarios for the world
economy, the problem is that these kind of models
do not account for the mechanisms through which
oil prices affect permanently GDP, namely its role
as an intermediate production function (on this is-
sue see Jones et al. (2004) and Esteves (2004)).
This section presents the results of two recent
studies published by the European Commission
(EC) (to the euro area) and the International En-
ergy Agency (IEA) (both to the euro area and the
US), and the simulations for Portugal carried out
with the Annual Macroeconometric Model (AMM)
used at Banco de Portugal as the benchmark
model to produce forecast or simulation exercises.
4.1. Recent OECD and EC simulations
Table 4 presents the rescaled results of the stud-
ies of the EC and the IEA. The shock corresponds
to a permanent increase of oil price by 100 per
cent, taking as initial price 30 USD and 25 USD, re-
spectively.
Concerning the effects on inflation, the results
are very similar for the euro area and the US econ-
omy. In the first year, the effects are slightly below
the “1 to 100" rule above mentioned to measure
the first round direct effects (between 0.7 and 0.9
per cent to the euro area and 0.7 to the US). The
major differences are related with the lagged ef-
fects on inflation across the EC and the IEA simu-
lations. While in the EC study the transmission to
prices seems to be very quick — with inflation be-
ing just 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points above the
baseline in the second and third years, respectively
— in the International European Agency, the peak
on inflation occurs in the second year of simula-
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Table 4
EFFECTS OF A 100 PER CENT INCREASE OF OIL PRICES
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
European Comission (2004)(a)
Euro area Consumer prices..................................... 0 . 9 1 . 1 1 . 2
G D P ............................................... -1.2 -1.5 -1.6
International Energy Agency (2004)(b)
Euro area Consumer prices..................................... 0 . 7 1 . 5 -
G D P ............................................... -0.7 -1.4 -
US Consumer prices..................................... 0 . 7 1 . 5 -
G D P ............................................... -0.4 -0.8 -
Notes:
(a) Original shock is 25 per cent since the beginning of 2004 (oil price around 30 USD in 2003).
(b) Original shock from 25 to 35 USD per barrel.tion (0.8 percentage points), leading to a more pro-
nounced effect in consumer price level (1.5 per
cent in the IEA and 1.1 in the EC).
Concerning the effects on GDP, the accumu-
lated effect two years ahead is -0.8 per cent for the
US economy, while both the EC and the Interna-
tional European Agency results converge to values
close to 1.5 per cent for the euro area. These results
confirms a lower sensitiveness of US GDP to an oil
price change, but they are lower than the ones sug-
gested by the terms of trade rule (-1.2 and - 2.5 per
cent to the US and the euro area, respectively).
Interestingly, the results produced by more spe-
cialized literature are closer to the ones suggested
by the terms of trade rule. As referred in Jones et
al. (2004), an accumulated GDP-oil price elasticity
during two years between -0.05 and -0.06 seem to
be in line with the recent empirical findings for the
US economy — namely Mork et al. (1994)] and
Hamilton (2003). The results reported in
Jiménez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004) point also
to an elasticity of -0.05 for the US and are in a
range from -0.03 to -0.05 for the euro area coun-
tries (these lower effects may be related with the
embodied depreciation of the euro). However, a
part of these estimated effects on GDP are related
with the answer of monetary policy to oil price
changes rather than the oil price shocks them-
selves — for instance, Bernanke et al. (1997) re-
duces the accumulated response of the US GDP
during 42 months from -0.055 to around an half, to
-0.023, when the federal funds rate is kept un-
changed at 4 per cent. Thus, controlling for the
temporary effects related with monetary policy re-
action, these figures are nearer to the terms of
trade rule than to the OECD and EC studies.
4.2. Results for Portugal
Results for Portugal can be achieved with the
model usually used at Banco de Portugal as a fore-
casting and simulating tool. This model, contrarily
to the most usual macroeconometric models, con-
siders a production function where oil is an inter-
mediate factor, therefore increasing its ability to
capture an oil price increase as a negative supply
shock. Chart 6 reports the results both in GDP and
in consumer prices of an increase of oil prices of
100 per cent, against a baseline in which oil price is
kept constant at 25 USD, and spillover effects are
considered using the procedure presented above.
The inflation is quickly affected in the first year
(around 1.2 percentage points), and then the ef-
fects start to disappear. Five years after the shock
inflation is very close to the baseline. As to the
GDP, its growth is mainly affected during the first
four years. After that period the effects start to die
out, converging to a long-run effect on GDP level
close to 4 per cent (in line with the “terms of trade
rule”).
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper tries to resume the effects of oil
prices on the economy, both on GDP and inflation,
presenting in a simple way the main channels un-
derlying those effects and, when possible, provid-
ing some rules of thumb for the size of the effects.
Concerning the effects on inflation, the main
conclusions are the following.
(i) The effects of oil prices in inflation may be
decomposed into:
(ia) First round direct effects on energy con-
sumption components. The results suggests that
consumer energy prices tends to react approxi-
mately 1 to 10 to an oil price change, which repre-
sents a reaction of 1 to 100 in overall inflation rate.
This rule of thumb seems to be stable both over
the last 30 years and across countries.
(ib) First round indirect effects are associated
with the fact that oil is an important production
input in other sectors of activity. It is not easy to
derive any rule of thumb for these indirect effects.
However, the decline of oil prices and the reduc-
tion of oil consumption per unit of output is likely
to have reduced the size of these type of effects.
(ic) Second round effects are mainly influ-
enced by the credibility of monetary policy and
the flexibility of labour market. On this issue,
given the lessons from the previous oil-shock epi-
sodes, presently, monetary policy seems to be
more oriented towards the moderation of inflation
expectations, allowing to reduce the magnitude of
these second round effects.
(ii) The effect on prices of an oil price increase
of 100 per cent is around 1-1.5 per cent in the sec-
ond year, both for the euro area and the US, while
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around 2 per cent in the second year.
Considering the effects on GDP, some conclu-
sions seem to emerge, using indicators that try to
measure the importance of oil as a production fac-
tor and as a source of a terms of trade shock, as
well the available model simulations and the re-
cent empirical findings of specialized literature.
(i) There is a strong evidence that the negative
reaction of GDP to oil price increases declined
over the nineties, reflecting both the decline of the
relative price of oil and the reduction of oil con-
sumption per unit of output.
(ii) It is dangerous to extrapolate a constant
GDP-oil price elasticity in order to produce simu-
lations concerning the effects of a new oil price
shock. Reflecting the small substitution between
oil and other resources (in particular over the short
and medium terms) the impact of the shock de-
pends positively on the price of oil. Thus the
GDP-oil relationship is nonlinear, towards more
sizeable effects when oil price is higher. In other
words, the effects on GDP when oil price increases
from 10 to 20 USD are smaller than then ones that
would occur if oil price doubles from its current
level above 40 USD.
(iii) Considering a price of around 25 USD and
using the net imports share on GDP, a negative
elasticity of around -2 per cent may emerge as a
prudent rule of thumb for the main developed
countries, encompassing however important dif-
ferences across countries, towards lower effects in
the UK, US and Japan (in the range -1 to -2 per
cent) and more pronounced ones in the main euro
area countries (in the range -2.5 to 3 per cent).
Those values are within the ones produced by
standard macroeconomic projection models and
the ones produced by more recent empirical find-
ings of specialized literature.
(iv) The Portuguese GDP exhibits a higher
sensitivity to oil price shocks, reflecting simulta-
neously a more intensive use of oil and a high
openness of the economy. The indicators and the
simulation results from the AMM model used at
Banco de Portugal suggest as rule of thumb a neg-
ative elasticity of around -0.04 (i.e. an increase of
the oil price from 25 to 50 USD could lead to an ac-
cumulated loss of GDP of around 4 per cent).
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Chart 6
EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE OF OIL PRICES OF 100 PER CENT
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